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Abstract
Expert-coded datasets provide scholars with otherwise unavailable cross-national longi-
tudinal data on important concepts. However, expert coders vary in their reliability and
scale perception, potentially resulting in substantial measurement error; this variation
may correlate with outcomes of interest, biasing results in analyses that use these data.
This latter concern is particularly acute for key concepts in peace research. In this article,
I describe potential sources of expert error, focusing on the measurement of identity-based
discrimination. I then use expert-coded data on identity-based discrimination to examine
1) the implications of measurement error for quantitative analyses that use expert-coded
data, and 2) the degree to which different techniques for aggregating these data ame-
liorate these issues. To do so, I simulate data with different forms and levels of expert
error and regress conflict onset on different aggregations of these data. These analyses
yield two important results. First, almost all aggregations show a positive relationship
between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset consistently across simulations,
in line with the assumed true relationship between the concept and outcome. Second, dif-
ferent aggregation techniques vary in their substantive robustness beyond directionality.
A structural equation model provides the most consistently robust estimates, while both
the point estimates from an Item Response Theory (IRT) model and the average over
expert codings provide similar and relatively robust estimates in most simulations. The
median over expert codings and a naive multiple imputation technique yield the least
robust estimates.
Expert-coded datasets such as the Electoral Integrity Project, the Bertelsmann Transfor-
mation Index and the Varieties of Democracy (V–Dem) Dataset allow scholars to conduct
cross-national longitudinal research on vital concepts (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, Nor-
ris, Frank & Mart´ınez i Coma 2014, Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning,
Teorell et al. 2018a). However, expert-coded data come with potential disadvantages.
Experts are susceptible to different sources of error (Clinton & Lewis 2008, Bakker, Jolly,
Polk & Poole 2014, Marquardt & Pemstein 2018b); such error may bias results in statis-
tical analyses (Lindsta¨dt, Proksch & Slapin 2018). These concerns are particularly acute
in the context of quantitative peace research. Outcomes such as conflict onset are rare
events, meaning that analyses will be particularly sensitive to measurement error on the
right-hand side. Measuring key correlates of conflict such as identity-based discrimina-
tion is a particularly fraught pursuit, since expert perceptions of this concept may be
endogenous to conflict.
Given these concerns, awareness of the degree to which different types and forms of
expert error substantively matter is of great importance, as is understanding of the extent
to which different aggregation strategies can correct for these errors. I provide insight
into these two issues by analyzing the relationship between civil conflict onset and an
expert-coded variable measuring identity-based discrimination. Specifically, I conduct a
series of simulation analyses in which I vary both the degree and form of expert error
in this variable. I then regress conflict onset on five different aggregations of these data:
1) the normalized average, 2) the zero-centered median, 3) the posterior median from an
ordinal Item-Response Theory (IRT) model, 4) multiple imputation over posterior draws
from the IRT model, and 5) a structural equation model that embeds the IRT model in
the estimation procedure. The first three methods are commonly-used point estimates
for expert-coded data, while the final two methods incorporate measurement uncertainty
into the analysis.
Results from these analyses indicate that most methods recover the correct (positive)
relationship between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset, even when expert
error is extremely high. Equally importantly, simulated systematic over-estimation of
identity-based discrimination by experts who code cases of conflict does not drastically
inflate the magnitude of this relationship. Indeed, in almost all cases expert error reduces
the magnitude of the relationship between identity-based discrimination and conflict on-
set. The most robust method for recovering the magnitude of the relationship is the
structural equation model, while the median and multiple imputation are the least ro-
bust.
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1 Measuring identity-based discrimination with expert-
coded data
Identity-based discrimination is a fundamental explanatory variable in studies of civil
conflict, ethnic conflict and separatism. Foundational works such as Gellner (1983), Gurr
(1993) and Horowitz (2000) argue that groups which face discrimination are among those
most likely to engage in conflict with other groups in a state.1 However, measuring
identity-based discrimination cross-nationally is a difficult task. Many scholars research-
ing this topic begin by enumerating the relevant identity groups in a country-year, then
adding additional data to this enumeration to reflect discrimination (Minorities at Risk
Project 2009, Vogt, Bormann, Ru¨egger, Cederman, Hunziker & Girardin 2015, Birnir,
Wilkenfeld et al. 2015, Birnir, Laitin, Wilkenfeld, Waguespack et al. 2018). At the
country level, the proportion of the population coded as facing discrimination proxies
identity-based discrimination.
Such an approach is problematic because ethnic categories often belie significant intra-
and inter-ethnic variation in the attributes that facilitate discrimination (Chandra 2006).
As a result, though a discriminated group may constitute 25 percent of a country’s
population, the proportion of the population facing discrimination may be much lower
(if many members of the group can pass as being members of another group) or higher
(if members of other groups are misidentified as being members of the group). Similarly,
the level of discrimination may vary across both groups and time, facts for which a
dichotomous indicator of discrimination attached to a group cannot account.
Given both the importance of the concept and concerns about its traditional op-
erationalization, alternative measures of identity-based discrimination that dispel with
the enumeration of groups are of potentially great value. However, such measurement
requires in-depth knowledge about specific countries, identity groups within those coun-
tries, and the discrimination those groups face. Equally importantly, given that the forms
of identity and discrimination vary across countries, this measurement requires substan-
tial judgment on the part of a coder. These criteria provide a clear rationale for the use
of expert coders.
1.1 Expert-coded data on identity-based discrimination
The V–Dem Project gathers cross-national longitudinal data on political institutions
ranging from state sovereignty to media freedom; the V–Dem v8 dataset covers the years
1900-2017, with coverage of a subset of states and variables extending back to 1789
(Coppedge et al. 2018a, Knutsen, Teorell et al. Forthcoming). 164 of the V–Dem variables
1These groups generally fall under the rubric of “ethnic groups,” though the definition of ethnicity
remains a topic of debate (Hale 2017).
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are directly coded by experts; the scale, prominence and transparency of the project make
its data an ideal laboratory for exploring the robustness of expert-coded data.
One V–Dem variable, “Social group equality in respect for civil liberties,” measures
identity-based discrimination (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell
et al. 2018b), asking experts to use a five-point Likert scale to code the degree to a
government deprives citizens of civil liberties on the basis of social identity.2 This question
is thus a rough corollary of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) variable discrimpop, which
measures the proportion of a country’s population that faces state-led discrimination due
to their ethnic identity (Vogt et al. 2015). In contrast to the group-based measurement
which EPR employs, the V–Dem question provides only vague instructions as to what
qualifies as a group (“language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste”), and does not
ask experts to provide any information about the groups themselves. Though this vague
formulation raises a different set of concerns (discussed in Section 1.2.3), it essentially
sidesteps fraught questions as to what constitutes ethnicity, allowing experts to choose
the politically-relevant ethnic-like categories in the case(s) which they code.
1,418 experts code some subset of cases for this question; following expert-coding best
practices, most observations of this variable have six or more expert coders.3
1.2 Sources of expert disagreement
Because latent concepts are difficult to observe, and Likert-scales provide only rough
guidance for translating continuous concepts to a categorical scale, experts will inevitably
disagree when coding.4 However, disagreement may also result from variation in expert
scale perception (differential item functioning, of DIF) and reliability (Clinton & Lewis
2008, Bakker et al. 2014, Lindsta¨dt, Proksch & Slapin 2018, Marquardt & Pemstein
2018b). In the case of concepts like identity-based discrimination, such variation may be
particularly problematic.
1.2.1 Differential item functioning
The most straightforward source of DIF is differences in expert understanding of the
question scales. For example, the words “much,” “substantially,” “moderately,” and
“slightly” modify the degree to which social groups enjoy fewer civil liberties in the V–
Dem question scale. These terms are vague: one expert’s “substantially” could easily be
another expert’s “much.” As a result, two experts who perceive the same latent level of
discrimination may report different values.
2Appendix A presents the description which experts see when coding these data.
3Appendix B provides more descriptive analyses of coding patterns.
4Appendix C provides descriptive analyses of patterns of disagreement for the coding of identity-based
discrimination.
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A similar issue results from the the word “some” in describing the number of social
groups which enjoy fewer civil liberties in the question scale, e.g. “members of some
social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than others” (italics added for emphasis).
Experts could perceive this term as encompassing a wide range of values (i.e. any number
more than one). For example, if only two groups face identity-based discrimination, one
expert might code the top value of the scale, while another might code a lower value.
Equally importantly, given that identity groups can be of different sizes—and there may
be inter- and intra-group variation in experiences of civil liberties deprivation—experts
likely use idiosyncratic heuristics to weight these criteria when determining whether or
not the “some” threshold is reached.
These examples provide ample reason to believe that DIF may be a concern in this
context. If DIF is randomly distributed across experts and there is a sufficiently large
number of experts, this source of expert disagreement is problematic only in that it
increases uncertainty about a latent concept. However, whether or not six experts (the
median number of experts per observation in this variable) is a sufficiently large number is
unclear. Moreover, DIF is most likely not randomly distributed across experts, presenting
even greater concerns.
1.2.2 Cross-national comparability
DIF may be clustered by cases, raising concerns about cross-national comparability. For
example, if a country changes from having relatively high levels of identity-based discrimi-
nation to a lower level, an expert who focuses on this country may code the change as more
extreme than would an expert with more comparative experience (Pemstein, Tzelgov &
Wang 2015). The concept of identity-based discrimination itself presents additional con-
cerns in this regard. Actors in conflict settings may use identity-based grievances to justify
their struggle, even if the true cause of conflict lies elsewhere (Fearon & Laitin 2000). Such
framing may lead country experts to post facto identify identity-based discrimination as a
cause of conflict, and therefore code a high level of discrimination. More generally, conflict
itself can lead to a higher salience of identity (Fearon & Laitin 2000, Gagnon Jr 1994),
potentially leading experts to identify social identity groups—and discrimination against
these groups—that had heretofore been largely latent. In other words, the coding of
identity-based discrimination may be endogenous to conflict, increasing the risk of spu-
rious correlations in regression analyses that use these data.
1.2.3 Reliability
Potential variation in expert reliability also raises concern regarding the use of expert-
coded data. As with DIF, some of this concern is general to expert-coding enterprises:
though V–Dem employs a rigorous procedure to select experts (Coppedge, Gerring, Knut-
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sen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell et al. 2018c), there is almost certainly variation in the
degree to which the 1,418 experts who code identity-based discrimination are knowledge-
able about both the case and the concept. More specific to identity-based discrimination,
the vagueness of “social groups” can lead to variation in reliability: experts may consider
different universes of groups when coding. To use an example from Fearon (2003), if a
scholar considers a tribe an ethnic group, Somalia is multiethnic; if she considers tribes
a sub-ethnic group, then it is monoethnic. In the latter case, Somalia could never expe-
rience variation in identity-based discrimination; in the former, it could. This example is
not a matter of DIF in that two hypothetical experts using different definitions of eth-
nicity could code different patterns: the expert who considers Somalia monoethnic would
never vary her coding, while the other expert could vary her coding substantially.
Other forms of variation in expert reliability are also possible. Reliable information
about identity politics may be less available in cases of conflict than in more peaceful
situations. Experts may have less first-hand information about the case, and thus be
forced to use less reliable sources to gather relevant information. In the polarized context
of identity-based conflict, experts may also provide drastically different codings: an expert
sympathetic to a regime may code discrimination as decreasing, while a regime opponent
may code the same concept as increasing in the same period.
1.3 Aggregation
Since all observations include codings from multiple experts, it is necessary to aggregate
these codings for the purposes of statistical analyses. In this article, I focus on three main
methods: 1) the normalized average; 2) the median; and 3) latent variable models, here a
modified Bayesian ordinal item response theory (IRT) model. A primary virtue of the first
two methods is that they are straightforward, with Lindsta¨dt, Proksch & Slapin (2018)
arguing that the median is a robust alternative to the more commonly-used average. The
virtue of the third modeling strategy is that it can account for both DIF and variation in
expert reliability; indeed, recent research has illustrated that an IRT model outperforms
both the normalized average and the median in recovering latent values when the level
of expert error is high (Marquardt & Pemstein 2018a, Marquardt & Pemstein 2018b).5
To explain how IRT models account for variation in expert scale perception and
reliability, I provide a brief overview of the standard V–Dem IRT model.6 Equation 1
presents the partial likelihood for this model.
5Aldrich-McKelvey (A–M) scaling is an alternative latent variable approach for aggregating expert-
coded data (Bakker et al. 2014). Since Marquardt & Pemstein (2018a) illustrate that hierarchical A–M
algorithms generally perform similarly–or slightly worse—than their IRT counterparts in most contexts,
I focus on IRT here.
6See Pemstein et al. (2018) for a more detailed description of this model; Appendix D provides details
on prior specification.
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Pr(yctr = k) = φ (τr,k − zctβr)− φ (τr,k−1 − zctβr) (1)
y represents the ordinal coding which expert r provides for country-year ct, and z the
latent value for this country-year. The model accounts for DIF through τ , k threshold
values that are specific to expert r; since thresholds provide the value relative to which z
must be greater in order for an expert to provide a given scale item over the next lowest,
this strategy allows scale perception to vary by expert. The model also clusters expert
thresholds by the main country for which an expert was recruited to code. Assuming
that experts who focus on the same country have similar understandings of the scale,
this strategy allows the codings of experts who also coded other countries to influence
the threshold values of experts who did not. In doing so, it facilitates cross-national
comparability by leveraging the bridging—or overlap in codings by experts who generally
code different countries and periods—in the V–Dem data (Pemstein, Tzelgov & Wang
2015).7
The model accounts for variation in expert reliability through β, the discrimination
parameter for expert r. Essentially, this parameter weights an expert’s contribution to
the measurement process based on the degree to which she diverges from other experts
who code the same cases as her, conditional on her thresholds: experts who diverge
more from other experts receive lower reliability scores, and thus contribute less to the
measurement process.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between point estimates for different aggregations
of expert coded data, dividing the data by conflict onset.8 Unsurprisingly, all three sets
of point estimates correlate strongly with each other for both cases of conflict onset and
those without. However, this high correlation belies substantial variation between the
point estimates for different methods. In particular, posterior median values for cases
with median values of -1 and 1 overlap significantly, indicating substantial divergence in
estimated levels of identity-based discrimination.
7The incorporation of vignettes (King & Wand 2007, Pemstein, Seim & Lindberg 2016) into the
measurement process also furthers this end.
8I use the posterior median for z values as the point estimate for the Bayesian IRT model. I estimate all
Bayesian models using Stan (Stan Development Team 2018). I create graphics using ggplot2 (Wickham
2009).
6
Figure 1: Relationship between different aggregations of actual data
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2 The model
Though there are clear differences in the estimates provided by different aggregation
techniques, it is unclear to what extent these differences actually matter in an applied
context. I therefore conduct a series of analyses with both actual and simulated data to
provide insight into the sensitivity of regression analyses to aggregation method. For all
these analyses, I use a very reduced probit model for the sake of simplicity. I employ
a Bayesian estimation strategy for its flexibility in incorporating measurement error in
latent variable estimates.9
The outcome in these models is the canonical dichotomous indicator of civil conflict
onset from the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg &
Strand 2002, Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015), aggregated to the country-year level with
GROWup (Girardin, Hunziker, Cederman, Bormann & Vogt 2015).10 The dataset in-
cludes 8,611 observations for 173 countries and 72 years. Conflict onset is a rare event,
occurring in only 2.8 percent of observations. As a result, these analyses should be highly
sensitive to perturbations in the expert-coded data and therefore provide a strong test of
9For a description of the advantages of the Bayesian multilevel modeling approach I take here, see
Shor, Bafumi, Keele & Park (2007). Appendix K provides analyses that use frequentist frameworks, with
countries and years modeled as either random or fixed effects. Results from these analyses are consistent
with those presented here, though the fixed effects models unsurprisingly show greater attenuation of
the relationship between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset.
10I remove observations with ongoing conflicts and listwise delete those not included in the V–Dem
data set.
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robustness.
As right-hand side variables I use 1) different aggregations of expert codings for
identity-based discrimination (with a one-year lag), 2) country and year effects and 3)
cubic splines. Equation 2 presents the baseline model:
Pr(yi = 1) = φ
(
αj + ψjzi−1 + ζj,1ti + ζj,2t2i + ζj,3t
3
i + Countryj,i + Y earj,i
)
(2)
Here φ represents the CDF of a normal distribution, i the observation and j the
iteration over the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. z represents the
point estimate for one of the three methods for aggregating expert-coded data, while
Country, Y ear and t are self-explanatory.11
Since uncertainty is an important aspect of the measurement of latent variables, incor-
porating this uncertainty in regression analyses is of clear value. The Bayesian estimation
strategy allows me to incorporate this uncertainty in two ways. First, it facilitates multi-
ple imputation using draws from the IRT model in Equation 1.12 Specifically, I rerun the
model eight times with each of 500 draws from the posterior distribution of z. Equation
3 illustrates this measurement strategy; the key distinction is the subscript k = 1, ..., 500,
reflecting the 500 posterior draws from z.
Pr(yi = 1) = φ
(
αj + ψjzk,i−1 + ζj,1ti + ζj,2t2i + ζj,3t
3
i + Countryj,i + Y earj,i
)
(3)
Second, I embed the IRT model within the regression equation, allowing me to iter-
atively estimate both z and φ. As with the multiple imputation model, this structural
equation model accounts for measurement error in the latent variable z. However, it
also allows the coefficient estimating the relationship between z and conflict onset (ψ) to
influence the estimation of z. In effect, ψ becomes a perfectly bridged equivalent of β in
Equation 1. In principle, since there are generally multiple experts coding each observa-
tion, ψ should not override the experts in the estimation of z. In practice, ψ adjudicates
between experts in cases of disagreement, lowering the influence of experts who disagree
with their peers in a manner inconsistent with the relationship between identity-based
discrimination and conflict. Equation 4 presents this model, with the subscript j on z
illustrating that z is estimated iteratively with all other model parameters.
Pr(yi = 1) = φ
(
αj + ψjzj,i−1 + ζj,1ti + ζj,2t2i + ζj,3t
3
i + Countryj,i + Y earj,i
)
(4)
11For technical details regarding the estimation strategy, see Appendix E.
12This approach is essentially a Bayesian implementation of the bootstrapped multiple overimputation
method described in Blackwell, Honaker & King (2017).
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Figure 2: Models using different aggregations of actual data
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3 Actual data analyses
Prior to analyzing data with different forms of simulated error, Figure 2 provides base-
line results from analyses of actual data, with identity-based discrimination aggregated
using each of the five different techniques (the average, the median, and the three IRT
modeling strategies). The left cell represents the coefficient estimate for identity-based
discrimination (ψ) using each of the five methods, while the right cell shows the predicted
difference in the posterior probability of conflict onset between a country with high and
low levels of identity-based discrimination.13 Points represent the median value over pos-
terior draws, while the horizontal lines represent 95% highest posterior density regions,
a Bayesian corollary of confidence intervals.
All coefficient and predicted effect estimates show a positive relationship between
identity-based discrimination and conflict onset.14 In other words, regardless of aggre-
gation technique, higher levels of identity-based discrimination correlate with a higher
probability of conflict. However, the magnitude of these differences varies, ranging from
about two percent for estimates based on the multiple imputation method, to about six
percent for estimates based on the average.
The variation in estimates for the three IRT methods is of particular interest: the
multiple imputation strategy estimates the weakest relationship between identity-based
discrimination and conflict onset, while the structural equation model yields a particu-
larly strong relationship. A possible explanation is that the median correlation between
posterior draws from both models and the posterior median (the point estimate for the
IRT model) is .90, and there is substantial variation in this correlation across draws. Es-
pecially since conflict onset is a rare event, this correlation structure could attenuate the
relationship between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset in the case of mul-
tiple imputation: the estimated relationship between identity-based discrimination and
13Appendix F describes the methodology for estimating the posterior-predicted effect magnitude.
14For ease of interpretation, I flip the scale of the coefficients such that higher values reflect higher
levels of discrimination.
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Figure 3: Relationship between posterior median of IRT models
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conflict may be weaker at individual draws from the posterior than it is at the median
value over posterior draws for each observation.
On the other hand, the structural equation model could strengthen the relationship
between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset. Recall that this modeling strat-
egy iteratively estimates the the coefficient (ψ), latent concept (z) and expert reliability
parameters (βr). Since identity-based discrimination has a positive relationship with con-
flict onset, this relationship could iteratively increase 1) the estimated level of identity-
based discrimination in country-years with conflict onset and thereby 2) the estimated
relationship between identity-based discrimination and conflict.
Figure 3 provides evidence that such iterative estimation is occurring, illustrating the
relationship between the posterior median estimates of z from the IRT model and the
same model embedded in the regression analysis (the structural equation model). While
there is a strong correlation between the posterior median values between the two IRT
models, the structural equation model consistently estimates the level of identity-based
discrimination in observations with conflict onset as being higher (lower values of z in
the original scale). Though this effect is subtle, it is apparently sufficient to strengthen
the estimated relationship between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset.
4 Simulation analyses
The previous analyses indicate that the method used in aggregating expert-coded data
can have substantive implications for the estimated relationship between a concept and
an outcome: point estimates of the predicted effect of identity-based discrimination range
from a .02 to .06 increase in the probability of conflict onset. However, they do not provide
insight into which method yields the most accurate estimates of this relationship. More
fundamentally, it is also unclear if any of these methods can yield estimates of use for
quantitative analyses if experts are severely flawed. To put it bluntly: if experts can be
unreliable and have dramatically different scale perceptions, to what extent can the use
of expert-coded data yield misleading results?
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To provide insight into these questions, I use data from the identity-based discrim-
ination variable to create ecologically-valid simulated data. More precisely, I use the
posterior median as the true values for identity-based discrimination across observations,
then simulate different forms and levels of expert error.15 While the posterior median
has a consistent relationship with conflict onset, this relationship is not extremely large
in magnitude, likely heightening the sensitivity of this relationship to expert error.
In the first set of simulations, I assume that variation in expert reliability and DIF is
randomly-assigned across experts. In the second, I assume that these two forms of error
predominantly affect experts who code countries in which ethnic conflict has occurred, in
line with the theoretical discussion in the previous sections.
I regress conflict onset on different aggregations of the simulated data, again using
the models in Equations 2-4. I replicate this procedure thrice for each form of simulated
error to check robustness.16
4.1 Random error
The first set of simulations assume that expert error is randomly distributed across ex-
perts, matching modeling assumptions in Marquardt & Pemstein (2018b). These simula-
tions include two levels of error for both expert reliability and DIF. The first level corre-
sponds to a moderate level of error, while the second corresponds to a high—essentially
nightmarish—level of error where DIF spans the threshold range and a substantial pro-
portion of experts have negative reliability.17
Figure 4 presents results from regressions that include moderate (top row) and high
(bottom row) levels of both types of expert error.18 As with the analyses of actual data, I
show both coefficient and effect estimates, divided by method of aggregation. Each aggre-
gation method now has three estimates, reflecting the three simulation replications. The
cells also have three vertical lines, representing the estimated true relationship between
identity-based discrimination and conflict estimate (i.e. the median and 95% credible
region for the posterior median in Figure 2). A method that fully recovers the true re-
lationship between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset would have a median
estimate on the middle line and credible regions that coincide with the left and right
15This choice of true values should not necessarily privilege any aggregation technique in the subsequent
analyses, though there is evidence that the median performs better when the underlying distribution of
true values is more uniformly distributed (Marquardt & Pemstein 2018a).
16Appendix H provides analyses of the correlation between the point estimates of different aggregation
techniques and the true values, across simulations and simulated forms of error. In line with ?, the
IRT posterior median consistently provides estimates with the strongest correlation with the true values
across different forms of simulated error, while the median over expert codings provides the weakest
correlation.
17Appendix G describes these algorithms in detail. I randomly assign DIF first to main country
clusters, then to experts; I assign variation in reliability directly to experts.
18Appendix I presents results from analyses with 1) moderate levels of DIF and high levels of variation
in expert reliability, and 2) high levels of DIF and moderate levels of variation in expert reliability.
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Figure 4: Models with aggregations of data with low and high expert error
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(d) Predicted effect estimate, high error
lines.
Perhaps the most important result in Figure 4 is that, even in a scenario of extremely
high simulated DIF and variation in expert reliability, all aggregation techniques result
in consistently positive estimates of the relationship between identity-based discrimina-
tion and conflict onset, in line with the assumed true relationship. However, the figure
also indicates that estimates from all aggregation techniques attenuate the relationship
between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset, even in the presence of only
moderate variation in expert reliability and DIF. The degree to which this attenuation
occurs varies across methods.
The structural equation model yields coefficient and effect estimates that are the
closest to the true relationship, and the credible regions for all estimates that use this
aggregation technique overlap with the point estimate for the true relationship. In con-
trast, the median and the multiple imputation techniques yield the most attenuated
estimates. This result is most apparent in the bottom right cell, in which the credible
regions of the estimated effect for both of these aggregation techniques do not overlap
with the true effect in any simulation. The average and the posterior median perform
similarly—worse than the structural equation model and better than the median and
multiple imputation—though the coefficient estimates for the posterior median tend to
12
be more in line with the true coefficients.
These analyses cumulatively indicate that expert-coded data—particularly when ag-
gregated with a structural equation model—are relatively robust to error even in the hard
case of conflict onset, though the level of robustness varies by aggregation technique.
4.2 Systematic error
Expert error may not be randomly distributed across experts, and such systematic error
may be even more problematic for analyses that use expert-coded data. I therefore create
two simulated datasets in which experts who focus on countries with ethnic conflict
systematically differ from other experts.19 In the first dataset, these experts have lower
reliability on average than other experts. This simulation approach is in line with the
concern that experts who code cases of conflict may have less access to information
about these cases, or are ideologically polarized and thus provide divergent codings. This
approach should further attenuate the relationship between identity-based discrimination
and conflict onset.
In the second dataset, experts who code ethnic conflict tend to perceive higher levels
of identity-based discrimination. This approach models the possibility that experts who
focus on cases in which ethnic conflict has occurred may be more attentive to identity-
based discrimination and therefore systematically code higher levels of such discrimination
than other experts. This simulation strategy could artificially increase the relationship
between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset.
Two caveats regarding both of these simulation strategies require note. First, though
error may be focused on a particular country and time period, here simulated error is
expert-specific. I do not model country- or time-specific error because they imply that all
data for these cases would be hopelessly problematic: no aggregation method can correct
for a situation in which all experts systematically code specific observations incorrectly.
Second, this simulation strategy assumes that the systematic differences in expert
reliability and DIF are constant across countries: an expert’s form of error is constant
across all the countries she codes. Though this approach has an intuitive rationale—
focusing on a case of ethnic conflict may systematically change how an expert perceives
the world—it is also possible that an expert’s form and level varies across cases.
With those caveats, I present results from simulations with systematic variation in
expert reliablity and DIF in turn.20
Figure 5 presents results from analyses of simulated data with systematic variation in
expert reliability. The structural equation model performs very well in this context: in
19More specifically, these forms of simulated data pertain to experts whose main country of focus is
one in which ethnic conflict occurred.
20Appendix J presents analyses of data in which there is systematic variation in both expert reliability
and DIF.
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Figure 5: Models with systematic reliability variation
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Figure 6: Models with systematic DIF
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two simulations, the point estimates and credible regions coincide substantially with the
true relationship. This context also provides the clearest distinction between the posterior
median and the mean across expert scores, with the posterior median consistently showing
lower levels of attenuation in the relationship between the concept and outcome. As
with previous analyses, multiple imputation and the median yield the most attenuated
relationships between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset.
Figure 6 presents results from analyses of simulated data with systematic DIF. Con-
trary to expectations, there is little evidence that this form of simulated DIF artificially
strengthens the relationship between identity-based discrimination and conflict. Instead,
the results again tend to show a generally attenuated relationship between identity-based
discrimination and conflict onset, though the structural equation model, posterior median
and mean all perform well in recovering the true relationship. The median and multiple
imputation again provide attenuated estimates of the relationship between identity-based
discrimination and conflict.
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5 Conclusion
The simulation analyses in this article have illustrated that results from quantitative
analyses using expert-coded data on identity-based discrimination are relatively robust
to a variety of forms and levels of expert error. As a rare event, civil conflict onset is an
outcome for which regression analyses are likely highly sensitive to expert error on the
right-hand side; the not overwhelmingly strong relationship between the expert-coded
concept and conflict onset increases this sensitivity. These analyses thus present a hard
test for the robustness of expert-coded data, which the data largely pass.
Despite their broad robustness, the analyses demonstrate that expert error almost
always attenuates the estimated relationship between the expert-coded concept and con-
flict. The level of attenuation varies based on the method used to aggregate the data.
The median across expert codings and multiple imputation consistently provide the least
robust estimates. The average across expert codings and the posterior median from an
IRT model provide estimates that are more robust; there is also some evidence that the
posterior median is more robust to variation in expert reliability than the average.
The most robust estimates of the relationship between the concept and conflict onset
come from a structural equation model, indicating that scholars should consider using
such a model in future quantitative research. To that end, my replication materials
provide code and instructions for using such models in different contexts.
These conclusions come with several scope conditions. First, the expert-coded data I
analyze here generally have codings from six or more experts; they are also bridged to a
greater extent than many other datasets. If there were fewer experts per observation or
less bridging, the data would almost certainly be less robust to the variation in reliability
and scale perception I simulate here. Second, in cases where the latent explanatory
variable has a stronger relationship with the outcome—and the outcome is not a rare
event—expert error likely attenuates their relationship to a lesser extent. Future research
would do well to probe these results using different outcomes and patterns of expert
coding.
Finally, the purpose of this article is to use data on identity-based discrimination
to theoretically motivate an analysis of the robustness of expert-coded data to different
forms of error, not to argue that these data are necessarily preferable to the traditional
group-based measurement of this concept. However, the results provide evidence that
this approach to measuring identity-based discrimination has face validity and is robust
to different forms of expert error. In conjunction with the potential theoretical benefits
of this approach, the results clearly warrant further investigation of the advantages of
measuring identity-based discrimination with and without groups.
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A Question for identity-based discrimination
Figure 7: Social group equality in respect for civil liberties.
Question: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race,
region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a
more favorable position?
Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, pri-
vate property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.
Responses:
1: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general
population.
2: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general
population.
3: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general
population.
4: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general
population.
5: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.
B Coding details and descriptive statistics
As discussed in the main text, 1,418 experts code some subset of cases for this question;
most observations of this variable have five or more expert coders. The project facilitates
cross-national comparability in two different ways. First, in addition to their main country
of focus, many experts also code another country for multiple years or multiple countries
for one year. Second, many experts also code anchoring vignettes (hypothetical cases
that an expert could plausibly code as being in two consecutive levels on the question
scale; King & Wand 2007, Pemstein, Seim & Lindberg 2016).
Figure 8 presents descriptive statistics regarding coding patterns for the identity-based
discrimination variable. The top cells present the number of experts per country (left)
and observation (right).21 The median number of coders per country is 13, compared
21These data have been reduced to regimes, or sequences of country-years in which no expert changed
her coding or self-reported confidence about her codings. This approach is a conservative way to deal
with perfectly-correlated observations (Pemstein et al. 2018).
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Figure 8: Coding and bridging density
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to six per observation; this difference reflects the fact that some coders do not code the
whole time series for all the countries they code, either because these countries are not
their main country of coding (the country for which they were recruited to code) or
they are new coders who only code recent years (e.g. 2005-2017, as opposed to 1900-
2017). Two final aspects of these graphics require explanation. First, there are numerous
observations and countries with one expert; these are data for countries and years prior
to 1900 (“Historical V–Dem”) and thus do not overlap with the data on civil conflict
which I use as an outcome in this article.22 Finally, the maximum number of experts
per country and observation (355) is much higher than the median, reflecting the experts
who coded vignettes (which are treated as separate countries in the data).
The bottom cells in Figure 8 show patterns of “bridging,” or the number of additional
countries which experts who coded an observation or country also coded (Pemstein, Tzel-
gov & Wang 2015). Bridging allows for the analysis of systematic differences in scale
perception between experts who mainly code different cases. Section 1.2.1 provides a de-
tailed description of this phenomenon—which the literature refers to as differential item
functioning, or DIF—but here suffice it to say that 1) such differences are plausible in
this context and 2) bridging is therefore very important.
As with the statistics regarding expert density, the bridging histograms are skewed
right due to vignettes having a very high number of experts who code different countries.
More generally, note that both the median observation and country have a relatively high
amount of bridging: there is a median of 10 bridges per observation, compared to 25 per
country. As a result, there appears to be a substantial amount of data to facilitate the
22I include these data in descriptive statistics because I also include them in the latent variable esti-
mation procedure.
20
estimation of systematic DIF across cases.
C Patterns of expert disagreement
Figure 9 illustrates patterns of expert disagreement regarding identity-based discrimina-
tion. The left cell provides a histogram of case-level standard deviation in codings, while
the right cell illustrates the relationship between the average coding and the standard
deviation (all cases with only one expert removed from the analysis). While there are
some cases—particularly at the extremes—on which all experts agree, especially toward
the middle of the scale there is substantial expert disagreement.
Figure 9: Patterns of expert disagreement
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D IRT model prior specifications
Following standard procedure for estimating latent values, I assume zct ∼ N(0, 1). Prior
specification for both thresholds and reliability follows standard V–Dem procedure. More
precisely, τr,k ∼ N(τc,k, .25), where c represents the estimated τk for experts who share
a main country of expertise. In turn, τc,k ∼ N(τµ,k, .25), where µ represents the global
τk; τµ,k ∼ U(−6, 6). To estimate reliability, I assume βr ∼ N(1, 1), restricted to positive
values for identification purposes.
E Technical details of regression analyses
All model parameters (α, ψ, ζ and country and year effects) have vague prior distributions,
i.e. N(0, 1). To avoid perfect autocorrelation, I use regime-reduced data for the IRT
estimates.
All models that use latent variable point estimates take 10,000 draws from eight
MCMC chains, with a burn-in of 1,000 iterations and a thinning interval of 10. Multiple
imputation models take 5,001 draws from eight MCMC chains, with a burn-in of 5,000
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draws. That is, each estimate is based on a single draw from each of the eight chains for
all 500 draws from the posterior distribution of z. The structural equation model takes
10,000 draws from eight MCMC chains, with a burn-in of 5,000 iterations and a thinning
interval of 10.
F Posterior prediction methodology
Although the distributions of identity-based discrimination are similar across methods
(approximately normal, centered about zero with most of their density in the inter-
val [-2,2]), the comparison of coefficients across methods nevertheless warrants caution.
The posterior estimates of effect magnitude ameliorate some of these concerns, because
they 1) take into account how changing aggregation methodology effects other parame-
ter estimates within the model and 2) represent effect estimates for similar quantities.
Specifically, methods that use a point estimate (the mean, median or posterior median)
all represent changes across intervals with the same density. In the case of the pos-
terior median, the estimated effect magnitude is the difference in the posterior prob-
ability of conflict onset between observations at the first and fourth threshold values:
(φ (αj + ψjτµ,4 + ζj,1µt + ζj,1µ
2
t + ζj,1µ
3
t ) − φ (αj + ψjτµ,1 + ζj,1µt + ζj,1µ2t + ζj,1µ3t )). For
the mean and median, the estimated effect magnitude is the difference between values
that encompass the same density. The method for estimating the effect magnitude for
the multiple imputation and structural equation models is substantively similar to that
for the posterior median, but taking universal threshold values at the relevant posterior
draws, e.g. τj,µ.
G Simulation algorithm description
G.1 Random error
For reliability, each β for expert r is distributed N(1, .5) in the moderate variation case
and N(1, 1) in the high variation case. DIF occurs at both the expert and country-of
focus level in both the moderate and high variation case. In the moderate variation case
τc,k ∼ N(τµ,k, .25) and τr,k ∼ N(τc,k, .25); in the high variation case the standard deviation
has a value of one at both levels. Importantly, there is a linear trend at both levels of the
simulated DIF: countries tend to have either a systematically higher or lower thresholds
compared to the average, as do experts within each country. I create this systematic
trend by restricting the variation to be either higher or lower than each overall threshold,
determining directionality for each case by a random draw from a Bernoulli distribution.
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G.2 Systematic variation in expert reliability
To simulate systematic variation in expert reliability, I assume moderate variation in
reliability, i.e. β ∼ N(1, .5). However, I restrict β ≤ 1 for experts whose country of focus
experienced ethnic conflict, leading many of these experts to have relatively low—and
occasionally negative—reliability.
G.3 Systematic DIF
To simulate systematic DIF, I assume that experts whose main country of focus is not one
in which ethnic conflict occurred have moderate threshold variation as in the previous
analyses. In contrast, experts whose country of focus is one in which ethnic conflict
occurred receive high threshold variation, with the main cluster values for these countries,
τc,k, restricted to be above the universal cluster values, τµ,k.
H Correlation of aggregation techniques with true
values in different types of simulated data
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Figure 10: Different forms of random variation in expert error
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Points represent Pearson correlation coefficient for point estimates with true values
across simulations.
Figure 11: Different forms of systematic variation in expert error
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I Analyses of simulated data with either high DIF
or high variation in expert reliability
The analyses of data with simulated random expert error conflate variation in expert
reliability and DIF. Figures 12 and 13 disaggregate the effects of these different forms
of error. Figure 12 presents results from analyses of simulated data with high variation
in reliability and moderate DIF. The results mirror those of the previous analyses: all
aggregations of simulated data recover a positive relationship between identity-based
discrimination and conflict onset, but attenuate this relationship to different extents.
The structural equation model once again outperforms other methods in recovering the
true relationship between identity-based discrimination and conflict onset, while multiple
imputation presents the most consistently attenuated relationship between the concept
and outcome (though the relationship remains consistently positive). Both the median
and and the mean provide the least consistent estimates of the relationship between
identity-based discrimination and conflict, with one simulation resulting in a coefficient
credible regions for both methods that overlap zero. Among the methods that use point
estimates of the concept, the posterior median is thus the most consistent.
Figure 13 presents analyses of simulated data with high DIF and moderate variation
in reliability. Again, the structural equation model is the best performing method for
aggregating these data, providing both coefficient and effect credible regions that overlap
with the true relationship; multiple imputation is the least well performing method. The
posterior median and the mean perform similarly in recovering true values, while the
median tends to be less consistent in this regard.
Figure 12: Bayesian models with aggregations of data with high variation in reliability
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Figure 13: Bayesian models with aggregations of data with high level of DIF
l
l
lMedian
Mean
Posterior median
Multiple imputation
Structural equation
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
(a) Coefficient estimates
l
l
lMedian
Mean
Posterior median
Multiple imputation
Structural equation
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
(b) Predicted effect estimate
J Analyses of simulated data with both systematic
DIF and variation in expert reliability
Figure 14 provides analyses of simulated data in which experts whose country of focus
experienced ethnic conflict evince both forms of expert error. The results are roughly
in line with those with just systematic DIF, though the level of attenuation across all
models is higher, and the structural equation model tends to have better coverage than
other models.
Figure 14: Bayesian models with both systematic DIF and reliability variation
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K Frequentist models
I present results from frequentist analyses of the same simulated data as in the Bayesian
analyses. The first section reports results from analyses that include country and year
random effects; the section reports results from fixed effect analyses.
There are two key distinctions in these figures vis-a´-vis those from the Bayesian analy-
ses. First, the measures of uncertainty about the coefficient point estimates are standard
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95% confidence intervals. Second, effect estimates are predictions from nonparametric
bootstraps, with uncertainty reflecting the 95% bootstrapped highest density intervals.
K.1 Country and year random effects
Figure 15: Random effects models using different aggregations of actual data
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Figure 16: Random effects models with aggregations of data with low and high expert
error
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Figure 17: Random effects models with aggregations of data with high variation in reli-
ability
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Figure 18: Random effects models with aggregations of data with high level of DIF
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K.1.2 Systematic error
Figure 19: Random effects models with systematic DIF
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Figure 20: Random effects models with systematic reliability variation
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Figure 21: Random effects models with both systematic DIF and reliability variation
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K.2 Country and year fixed effects
Figure 22: Fixed effects models using different aggregations of actual data
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Figure 23: Fixed effects models with aggregations of data with low and high expert error
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Figure 24: Fixed effects models with aggregations of data with high variation in reliability
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Figure 25: Fixed effects models with aggregations of data with high level of DIF
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K.2.2 Systematic error
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Figure 26: Fixed effects models with systematic DIF
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Figure 27: Fixed effects models with systematic reliability variation
l
l
l
Median
Mean
Posterior median
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
(a) Coefficient estimates
l
l
l
Median
Mean
Posterior median
0.00 0.04 0.08 0.12
(b) Predicted effect estimate
Figure 28: Fixed effects models with both systematic DIF and reliability variation
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